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Abstract: Ramsey famously condemned discounting “future enjoyments”
as “ethically indefensible”. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which,
when social choice is utilitarian, implies giving equal weight to all individu-
als’ utilities. By contrast, Arrow (1999a, b) accepted, perhaps reluctantly,
what he called Koopmans’ (1960) “strong argument” implying that no eq-
uitable preference ordering exists for a sufficiently unrestricted domain of
infinite utility streams. Here we derive an equitable utilitarian objective
for a finite population based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original
position, where there is an equal probability of becoming each person. For
a potentially infinite population facing an exogenous stochastic process of
extinction, an equitable extinction biased original position requires equal
conditional probabilities, given that the individual’s generation survives the
extinction process. Such a position is well-defined if and only if survival
probabilities decline fast enough for the expected total number of individ-
uals who can ever live to be finite. Then, provided that each individual’s
utility is bounded both above and below, maximizing expected “extinction
discounted” total utility — as advocated, inter alia, by the Stern Review on
climate change — provides a coherent and dynamically consistent equitable
objective, even when the population size of each generation can be chosen.
Keywords: Discounting, time perspective, fundamental preferences, funda-
mental utilitarianism, consequentialization, Vickrey–Harsanyi original po-
sition, Suppes equity, intergenerational equity, sustainable preferences, ex-
tinction discounting.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Discounting Issue: Weighting Future Generations
The question of whether and how to discount the welfare of future gen-
erations has played a critical role in discussing the ethical and economic
foundations of long-run policy analysis. This is especially true in the case of
climate change which, if managed badly enough, could even accelerate the
possibility of human extinction. Indeed, how much to discount the welfare
of future generations was a particular, and a particularly contentious, issue
addressed by Arrow (1999a, 1999b) himself. In those two largely overlap-
ping articles, he attributed to Koopmans (1960) two arguments in favour of
discounting the welfare of future generations. The first “strong” argument,
set out also by Koopmans, Diamond, and Williamson (1964) as well as by
Diamond (1965) on his own, was that, without giving less weight to utili-
ties far in the future, no complete and transitive preference ordering on the
entire space of infinite utility streams could satisfy the usual continuity and
weak Pareto conditions.1 The second “weak” argument was that failure to
discount later generations’ utilities would imply that earlier generations are
condemned to make excessive sacrifices.
The discounting issue subsequently received extensive attention in the
Stern Review (Stern, 2007) and in various reactions to it, not least Arrow’s
(2007). Indeed, it seems quite likely that carefully and attentively reading
the Stern Review led KA to have some doubts about his own earlier articles.2
This helps explain why he appeared so keen to make the discounting issue
the subject of one-on-one discussions with one of us (PH) over at at least
two lunches at Stanford during the approximate period 2014–2015.3
1Peter Diamond kindly prompted us to recall that Koopmans (1960, p. 287) had the
“utility function” of an “individual consumer” as his primary concern. When considering
optimal growth, Koopmans (1965, 1967) does consider the case when the utility of future
generations is discounted.
2From now on we frequently refer to Kenneth Arrow and the three authors of this
paper using a pair of initials — i.e., KA, GC, PH and NS.
3During these discussions PH remained unaware of Arrow (1999a, 1999b), whose ex-
istence KA was too modest to mention. But it was clear that KA had been inspired by
his late friend Tjalling Koopmans, who had been a mentor during his time at the Cowles
Foundation when it was still in Chicago. It is also said that Koopmans had persuaded
KA and Ge´rard Debreu to amalgamate their separate working papers into what became
Arrow and Debreu’s (1954) classic paper on existence of general competitive equilibrium.
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1.2 Fundamental Utilitarianism
The paper we present here follows many others in addressing the discounting
issue by applying modern ideas of social choice theory with interpersonal
comparisons, some of which Arrow (1977) himself approved in the early
years. Inspired by Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, we consider
an “impartial spectator” who uses consequentialist decision theory (Ham-
mond, 1996a, 1998) to contemplate how to navigate arbitrary finite decision
trees when the consequences belong to a domain of complete lifetime his-
tories of everything that should be relevant to decisions affecting a single
individual. In particular, we follow Kolm (1994) but contradict Broome
(1993) in asserting that any “cause of preference” which is ethically relevant
should be an “object of preference” included in the consequence domain of
all ethically relevant lifetime histories.
When contemplating decisions affecting a whole society, we imagine a
“social benefactor”. This benefactor’s concern is with consequence lotteries
which emerge from a significant modification of Rawls’ (1971) original posi-
tion, behind a veil of ignorance. Specifically, we avoid extreme risk aversion
assumed by Rawls, which was brought out in Harsanyi (1975) and Ham-
mond (1975). Instead we follow both Vickrey (1945) and Harsanyi (1953,
1955) in assuming that a lottery determines, in effect, which individual in
society the benefactor will become, and so whose personal consequence is
relevant ex post, after this lottery has been resolved. Harsanyi in particular
postulates an “ethical observer” who acts as if there were an equal chance
of becoming any named individual upon emerging from what we will call
the “Vickrey–Harsanyi” original position. Treating all potential individu-
als equally in this way accords with the concept of equity due to Suppes
(1966) and applied to social choice theory by Sen (1970, Chapter 9*), then
by Hammond (1976, 1979) and many successors. In this setting, consequen-
tialist rationality implies that the impartial benefactor should maximize the
average expected utility over the entire population. With an infinite set
of future generations, however, this equal chance lottery is not even well
defined. That is one reason why the strong argument for discounting that
Arrow attributes to Koopmans seems so persuasive.
1.3 Extinction Discounting
In this social choice context, in order to escape the iron logic of Koop-
mans’ strong argument, we recognize some relevant physical reality, and the
ultimate inevitability of mass extinction. This may occur due to the astro-
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physics of the sun, whose energy releases will gradually intensify beyond a
level consistent with continued life on Earth. Also, though the likelihood
of a devastating asteroid impact may ultimately be reduced by human in-
genuity, it is unlikely ever to be eliminated entirely. Finally, there is the
possibility of a mass extinction event due to a supervolcano on Earth, or
to an intense gamma-ray burst from a source close enough to be within our
Milky Way galaxy.
Accordingly we postulate that the possibility of such events together
determine a background hazard process whose outcome is a risky extinction
date beyond which human life will be impossible. We treat this process as
exogenous, in the sense that human action can never reduce the hazard rates
behind this background process, but may increase them.
Our main result concerns the effect of “extinction discounting”, which
is when this background process is used to determine what discount factor
should apply to each future generation’s utility levels. This accords with the
ideas of Sidgwick (1907), Ramsey (1931), Mirrlees (1967) and Dasgupta and
Heal (1979), as well as Stern (2007, 2008, 2014a, b, 2015).4 Specifically, we
give three conditions that are jointly sufficient for an “extinction discounted”
sum of future generations’ utilities to give a well-defined Bergson social
welfare function whose expected value should be maximized. These sufficient
conditions are:
1. following Arrow (1951, 1965, 1971), as well as Blackwell and Girshick
(1954) and Hammond (1998), the fundamental utility function that the
impartial spectator and benefactor applies to any individual’s personal
consequences is bounded both above and below;
2. any individual who never exists is assigned a unique specific utility
level that is normalized to zero;
3. attention is restricted to a restricted domain of intergenerational con-
sequence streams for which the background extinction process is fast
enough, and the rate of population growth slow enough, to ensure that
with extinction discounting applied to the size of each generation, the
expected total discounted population is finite and uniformly bounded.
4Here we note the influence of James Mirrlees, whose Ph.D. dissertation on optimal
growth (Mirrlees, 1963), contrary to some accounts, had KA as an active external exam-
iner rather than supervisor. In Cambridge during the late 1960s co-authors PH and NS
learned about exponential discounting from Mirrlees, who was their and Dasgupta’s Ph.D.
supervisor, while also providing Heal with valued informal advice.
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Moreover, as discussed in Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 9), the utilitarian
objective with extinction discounting that we consider can be derived from
an intergenerational variation of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position.5 In
this variation, rather than each individual having the same probability of be-
ing selected, each has the same conditional probability given the event that
their generation comes into existence early enough to survive the random
background extinction process.6
1.4 Outline
The remainder of the paper begins with some brief recapitulations of key
ideas. First, Section 2 recalls the key distinction between discounting the
utility as opposed to the consumption of individuals in future generations.
It also sets out Arrow’s (1999a, 1999b) reasons for claiming that the utilities
of future generations should be discounted.
Next, Section 3 discusses how “consequentialized” ethics can be com-
bined with consequentialized decision theory to make a case for an impar-
tial spectator/benefactor to maximize the expected value any fundamental
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function in a unique cardinal equivalence
class, defined on an appropriate domain of personal consequences. Moreover,
following ideas that Kolm (1972, 1998) ascribes to Tinbergen (1957), this
fundamental utility function, including its domain, should be the same for
all individuals. Finally, to allow for individuals whose potential existence is
precluded by extinction, this domain should include a personal consequence
associated with non-existence.
Section 4 extends the decision analysis of Section 3 to a society of finitely
many individuals. To do so, it introduces a generalization of the even chance
lottery that arises in the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position. Any general-
ized lottery reduces a multi-person decision problem to one with a single
lottery. In the case of an even chance lottery, this can be regarded as
decision-making by an impartial benefactor who abides by the Suppes equity
principle.
5Dasgupta and Heal point out that an intergenerational extension of the Vickrey–
Harsanyi original position had already been discussed by Rawls (1971, pp. 287–8), though
without any mention of possible extinction. We note that Dasgupta and Heal’s analysis
considers generations of individuals who live for only one period. It also precludes gener-
ations of different sizes, which may also be endogenous because they can be affected by
policy choices, including those that increase the endogenous risk of extinction.
6See Ord (2020) for an alternative philosophical analysis that, inter alia, also supports
extinction discounting.
4
With infinitely many potential individuals, the even chance lottery that
the impartial benefactor uses in an Vickrey–Harsanyi original position be-
comes logically incoherent. Section 5 introduces a more structured model
with an infinite sequence of generations, each with a finite population, as
well as a background extinction process. Then we consider an “extinction bi-
ased” original position that equates individuals’ conditional probabilities of
being selected, given the event that they belong to a generation that comes
into existence early enough to survive the random extinction process. These
equated conditional probabilities exist if and only if the expected total num-
ber of individuals in all generations that survive the stochastic extinction
process is finite. Then, provided we apply Arrow’s boundedness assumption
to the fundamental utility function, the corresponding expected utility of an
extinction biased benefactor is an absolutely convergent sum. So expected
utility maximization for this benefactor is well defined, and is equivalent to
applying extinction discounting to each generation’s total utility.
Next, Section 6 considers Chichilnisky’s (1996) objection that any wel-
fare criterion based on discounted utility must involve a “dictatorship of the
present”. A mixed criterion is proposed, fulfilling Chichilnisky’s definition
of sustainable preferences by avoiding not only a dictatorship of the present,
but also a dictatorship of the future.
The last main Section 7 extends our results to the important case when
we the set of individuals belonging to each successive generation is treated
as an endogenous variable that is affected by policy choices. The extinction
discounted expected utility objective of Section 5 can still be applied on a
restricted domain with exogenous population bounds on the population of
each generation. This objective, however, is equivalent to maximizing the
expectation of the extinction discounted total utility of all generations. The
objective is well defined, independently of the population bounds, on the re-
stricted domain of generation structures for which the extinction discounted
total population exists and is uniformly bounded.
Finally, Section 8 offers some concluding discussion.
2 Discounting What?
2.1 The Social Rate of Discount for Future Consumption
It is important to distinguish discounting future consumption from discount-
ing future utility. Following what has become standard practice since at least
Arrow and Kurz (1970) as well as Stern (1977), Section 3 of Arrow (1999a)
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gives the formula r = ρ+ θg for the social rate of discount to be applied to
future consumption, where:7
ρ is the of pure time preference (if any), θ is the elasticity of
marginal utility with respect to income, and g is the of growth
of consumption per capita . . . ρ = 0 implies equal treatment of
present and future.
Thereafter Section 4 of Arrow (1999a) starts as follows:
In [the] formula [r = ρ + θg], the second term, θg, is, I think,
fairly uncontroversial. If future individuals are going to be better
off than we are, then our willingness to sacrifice on their behalf is
certainly reduced. It would require a greater of return to justify
our depriving ourselves of consumption.
But the presence of pure time preference, denoted by ρ, has been
very controversial. The English economists, in particular, have
tended to be very scornful of pure time preference.
In the ensuing discussion of the term θg, Arrow (1999a) considers how
to value an increment in a good in the future, relative to an increment now.
This is the discount factor, which we denote by β, for that good at that
time. In the continuous time model that Arrow uses, the proportionate rate
of decrease of the discount factor is given by −β˙/β = − ddt lnβ. It is the
discount rate for that good at that time; it clearly depends on both the
good and the time. In our view, the focus in economic assessments should
be on the discount factor, as that is the key shadow price, relative to now,
which is needed to find the marginal present value of any change in costs
or benefits occurring at any specific time in the future. When we need to
evaluate a stream of costs and benefits over time, we can consider the net
present value (NPV) of the whole stream, with the costs and benefits at each
time t weighted by the discount factor β(t). That is, at time 0 one considers
NPV :=
∫ T
0 β(t) b(t) dt, where b(t) denotes net benefit at time t, and T
denotes the terminal time. When allowing for the inevitable uncertainty
surrounding future costs and benefits, one approach is to consider their
expected discounted value.
Once we have the right concept of the discount factor that should be ap-
plied to future consumption, it becomes immediately clear that this factor
7This is sometimes described as the “Ramsey equation”. Yet the closest analogy in
Ramsey (1928) seems to be equation (9) on p. 554, which however involves the elasticity
of utility rather than of marginal utility.
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will depend on the state of affairs at each relevant time in the future. Un-
managed climate change could make future generations very poor. Then we
might place a very high value on extra goods that are available in calamitous
circumstances. This could even imply negative discounting, or equivalently,
a discount factor greater than one. This possibility also makes it clear that
each uncertain future state of the world that could occur is of critical rele-
vance. So, too, is the person or persons who may experience increments in
income. Indeed, using the term “the discount rate”, as if there is just one
given rate, clearly constitutes a serious misunderstanding of the basic issues.
So the relevant discount rates in any calculation of expected discounted
value are endogenously determined as a result of our planned decisions.
Moreover, this endogeneity is potentially severe in the case of climate change.
After all, if unmanaged climate change causes devastation and deep poverty
in the future, that suggests we should weight future consumption higher
than present consumption, which implies negative discounting.
2.2 Discounting the Welfare of Future Generations
Our concern in this paper, however, is much more with the ρ term of the
formula r = ρ + θg that Arrow (1999a) gives for the discount rate. This is
often called pure time discounting, or pure time preference. It arises when
we contemplate policies whose effects, like the climate change induced by
greenhouse gas emissions, extend far into the future. This should force us to
give some value to the consumption of people who live in the future. Pure
time discounting involves, and is even essentially defined as, the relative
weight attached to a life in the future compared to a life now, when the two
lives are otherwise identical in all respects. That is, the only difference is
that one life is in the future, whereas the other is right now.
If the pure time discount rate were 2% per annum, for example, then a
life starting 35 years in the future that is otherwise identical to a life that
starts now, would have a relative value of 1.02−35 ≈ 0.5 compared to a life
that starts now. In this sense we are “discounting future lives”, which is
effectively discriminating by date of birth. It cannot be justified by some
notion of the future life being better because it has higher consumption;
that would be discounting future consumption, as considered in Section 2.1,
as opposed to discounting future welfare per se. We emphasize that we are
making an ethical comparison between two lives that are identical, except
for the dates of birth. It is very difficult to find serious ethical arguments
for the kind of discrimination that is involved in giving less weight to future
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generations’ well-being. Indeed, Dasgupta and Heal (1979, p. 262) remind
us of a highly relevant passage from Sidgwick (1907, p. 414):
“How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they
seem to conflict with those of existing human beings? It seems
. . . clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the
value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that
the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as
those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his
actions on posterity — and even the existence of human beings
to be affected — must necessarily be more uncertain.”
In his celebrated paper on optimal saving, Ramsey (1928, p. 261) famously
started out by following the spirit of Sidgwick when he refused to discount
the welfare of future generations:
One point should perhaps be emphasised more particularly; it is
assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison
with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and
arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.8
Arrow (1999b) not only quotes this passage from Ramsey, but also adds
two later quotes from other English economists. The first is from Pigou
(1932, p. 25) stating that pure time preference “implies . . . our telescopic
faculty is defective.” The second is Harrod’s (1948, p. 40) claim that “[P]ure
time preference [is] a polite expression for rapacity and the conquest of
reason by passion.”9
2.3 Discounting Our Own Future
When individuals contemplate their own future consumption, a discussion
of how to discount it very like that in Section 2.1 might easily arise. On the
other hand, if the same individuals contemplate their own future standard
of living, there may be a closer parallel with Section 2.2. For example,
an individual saving for retirement might want to discount future income
somewhat if there is no longer any need to cover the expense of travelling
to work, or of being able to live very close to work.
8The latter part of the paper “no longer reckon[s] future utilities and disutilities as
equal to present ones, but discount[s] them at a constant rate ρ.” (Ramsey, 1928, p. 553).
9Among numerous discussions of intergenerational equity, we mention here only Arrow
et al. (1996). For an extensive list of many other works, see our working paper Chichilnisky
et al. (2018).
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Such discounting of our own futures is quite different from what con-
cerns us here. We are examining the ethical issue of whether there is any
justification for discounting a life simply and only on the grounds that it
starts later. It is not clear why the impatience of an individual who may
value the future less than the present should be at all relevant to ethics.
The fact some people are sometimes impatient in their own decisions does
not tell us that there is any moral justification for discriminating between
different people just because some are born decades later than others.
At this point it may be worth reminding the reader that market prices
and interest rates, or rates of return, are very unlikely to give us ethical eval-
uations of the kind needed to guide society toward good decisions. Instead,
they describe facts concerning the outcomes (equilibrium or otherwise) of
the individual choices of many market participants. Indeed, market interest
rates typically do not even give ethically appropriate individual marginal
valuations, especially given the many interrelated imperfections that seem
inevitable in capital markets — as argued, for example, in Hammond (1992).
Looking at market rates is rarely an ethically defensible route to the social
evaluations that are necessary here.
Note, however, that just as mortality is one reason for discounting our
own futures, so the possibility of human extinction is a reason for discounting
social outcomes. This, of course, is the key idea behind extinction discount-
ing, which we take up starting in Section 5.
2.4 The Strong Argument
The first reason that KA gave for discounting, impatience, or time perspec-
tive was what we will call the “strong argument”. This is to be distinguished
from what Arrow (1999b) explicitly describes as the “weak Koopmans ar-
gument”, which receives brief attention in Section 2.6 below, as well as in
Section 8.3.
To quote Arrow (1999b):10
Why then not embrace the idea of zero time perspective? Koop-
mans in several classic papers (1960, 1964) gave a crushing an-
swer; see also Brown and Lewis (1981) for a more general treat-
ment. The argument seems recondite. Koopmans considers a
world which lasts forever. Therefore choice (including ethically-
based choice) is based on a preference ordering over infinite-
10The opening question in the quotation is a valuable addition in Arrow (1999b) to
the corresponding passage in Arrow (1999a). The second “classic paper” is presumably
Koopmans, Diamond, and Williamson (1964).
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dimensional consumption streams. He argues that if the order-
ing is continuous and also sensitive (i.e., if one stream is never
worse than another and is better at one or more time points,
then it must be strictly preferred), it must display impatience.
A simple restatement of his reasoning can bring out the essential
point. I confine myself to the intertemporally separable case.
Imagine initially that output consists of a constant stream of
completely perishable goods. There can be no investment by
definition. Now imagine that an investment opportunity occurs,
available only to the first generation. For each unit sacrificed
by them, a perpetual stream of α per unit time is generated.
If there were no time preference, . . . we can say that given any
investment, short of the entire income, a still greater investment
would be preferred.
Thus, Arrow concludes that without impatience the optimal saving rate
could become arbitrarily close to 100%. A similar conclusion emerges from
the cake-eating example described by Gale (1967, p. 4, Example 2).
Nevertheless, the following passage from Koopmans (1960, pp. 287–288)
suggests that he at least intended his results to be applied only in the rather
different context of consumer choice:
This study started out as an attempt to formulate postulates per-
mitting a sharp definition of impatience, the short term Irving
Fisher has introduced for preference for advanced timing of sat-
isfaction. To avoid complications connected with the advancing
age and finite life span of the individual consumer, these pos-
tulates were set up for a (continuous) utility function of a con-
sumption program extending over an infinite future period. The
surprising result was that only a slight strengthening of the con-
tinuity postulate . . . permits one to conclude from the existence
of a utility function satisfying the postulates, that impatience
prevails at least in certain areas of the program space.
Thus, it seems that Koopmans (and Diamond) started out by consid-
ering only consumers who discount their own future selves, as discussed in
Section 2.3.11 Nevertheless, it was natural for Arrow to consider the ob-
vious extension to social choice theory, with an infinite series of successive
11Stern (2014b, p. 472; 2015, p. 169) also quotes a recent personal communication in
which Peter Diamond, a co-author of Koopmans et al. (1964), had argued to the effect
that the results of this line of work, if they would indeed preclude intergenerational equity,
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generations. Indeed, this follows the tradition of the later works by Koop-
mans (1965, 1967), who even devotes part of these surveys to the Ramsey
case when the welfare of future generations remains undiscounted. Then
the same mathematical analysis which, under some conditions, shows that
a consumer cannot treat equally consumption in an infinite number of peri-
ods, also rules out intergenerational equity, in the sense of treating all future
generations equally.
2.5 Two Kinds of Domain Restriction
Note that the strong argument says only that discounting is required if one
tries to construct a “sensitive” and continuous complete and transitive pref-
erence ordering over an unrestricted domain of infinite consumption streams.
When one considers a suitably restricted domain of infinite intergenerational
consumption streams, then as KA was surely well aware, Ramsey (1928) had
already shown that an optimal savings plan could well exist without any dis-
counting. More generally, following Gale (1967), Mirrlees (1967) and others,
there is a standard convergence condition for existence of an optimal growth
path satisfying the equation r = ρ+θg as a first-order condition for the con-
tinuous time optimization problem. The convergence condition requires the
social rate of discount r to exceed the sum of the rate of growth of popula-
tion and the rate of technical progress. Indeed, if the elasticity θ is greater
than 1, then the higher is g (the growth rate, or rate of technical progress),
the more likely it is that r become large enough so that the relevant welfare
integral converges. When it does converge, one avoids the kind of oversaving
problem that can arise in the cake-eating example due to Gale (1967).12
The main result of our paper, however, considers a second kind of do-
main restriction. Assuming a bounded utility function and an exogenous
background extinction process, we prove that a sensitive and continuous
complete and transitive preference ordering does exist on the restricted do-
main of personal consequence streams for which the expected extinction
discounted population is finite. Moreover, the ordering satisfies a suitable
version of intergerational equity.
should not be applied to the issue of whether to discount the welfare of future generations.
Instead Diamond has argued in favour of the kind of “pragmatic” criteria discussed in
Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Chichilnisky et al. (2018).
12See Stern (2014b; 2015, p. 166) for some recent discussion.
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2.6 The Weak Argument
Arrow (1999a) offered an additional reason for abandoning intergenerational
equity:
I therefore conclude that the strong ethical requirement that
all generations be treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts a
very strong intuition that it is not morally acceptable to demand
excessively high savings rates of any one generation, or even of
every generation.
A very similar argument is adduced in Arrow (1999b), where he adds:
Not merely is saving arbitrarily close to 100% unacceptable but
very high sacrifices are also. I call this the weak Koopmans ar-
gument.
And in Arrow (2007, p. 4) he writes:
Tjalling Koopmans pointed out in effect that the savings rates
implied by zero time preference are very much higher than those
we observe. (I am myself convinced by this argument.)
This kind of argument, and its relation to intergenerational equity, were
discussed by Asheim, Buchholz, and Tungodden (2001) and then Asheim
and Buchholz (2003). Their main result demonstrates that, given any effi-
cient and non-decreasing consumption allocation, there exists a utility func-
tion for which that allocation is a unique maximum of the undiscounted
sum of utilities over all future generations. This relies, however, on a key
“technological” assumption that any efficient and non-decreasing consump-
tion allocation maximizes the finite present discounted value of consumption
with discount factors that decrease over time. This assumption seems to rule
out the kind of climate emergency that the world may be facing currently.
Later, the weak argument was discussed in Stern (2007, 2008, 2015) —
see especially Stern (2008, p. 16), which cites Mirrlees and Stern (1972).
In his comment on the Stern Report, however, Arrow (2007, p. 4) himself
suggests that, at least in the context of mitigating climate change, the dis-
counting issue may lack practical importance:
Many have complained about the Stern Review adopting a value
of zero for ρ, the social rate of time preference. However, I find
that the case for intervention to keep CO2 levels within bounds
12
(say, aiming to stabilize them at about 550 ppm) is sufficiently
strong as to be insensitive to the arguments about ρ.13
Thus, KA’s reasoning included the recognition that, even with substantial
pure-time discounting, unmanaged climate change has the potential to cause
damage severe enough to justify strong action.14
We would agree, while noting that Stern (2015) in particular discusses
how many current economic models fail to capture adequately the immense
potential damage. We also note the observation from Box 1 in Stern (2008,
p. 20) that, for any choice of discount rates, we can construct a stream
of damages over time so that the present discounted value of losses from
climate change is infinite.
On the other hand we note that, in the years since Arrow wrote in (2007),
there has been extraordinary technical progress in developing renewable en-
ergy sources, as well as low and even negative carbon technologies. This
progress suggests that, as discussed in Section 8.3, the “weak argument” in
favour of discounting is steadily becoming even weaker.
3 An Impartial Spectator’s Fundamental Utility
3.1 A Universal Domain of Personal Consequences
Our interest is in applying prescriptive social choice theory to the issue
of determining what discount rates one should apply to future generations’
welfare. For this application we use an individualistic theory of social conse-
quences that starts with a “universal” personal consequence domain, which
we take to be a non-empty set Y whose typical member y has many at-
tributes or dimensions.
We postulate that each personal consequence y ∈ Y is comprehensive.
That is, it must include everything that should be of concern to an ideal-
ized version of the “impartial spectator” who plays such a key role in Adam
13Since KA wrote this, the scientific evidence on the potential damage from unmanaged
climate change has grown ever more worrying. The IPCC (2018) report documents the
significant risk of potentially very large damages from allowing temperatures to rise by
2◦C instead of 1.5◦C. This supports the argument that the Paris COP21 target agreed in
December 2015 of holding temperature increases to “well below 2◦C” should be tightened
to 1.5◦C. Achieving this is likely to require net global CO2 emissions being reduced to
zero by 2050. In particular, KA’s suggestion that CO2 levels should be stabilized at about
550ppm should now be seen as far too high.
14The later joint paper by Arrow et al. (2013) even advocates a declining discount factor,
though this may be easier to justify if it is applied to monetary measures of consumer
benefit when these are increasing over time.
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Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. In particular, it must include the in-
dividual’s own preferences and beliefs, insofar as they are deemed relevant.
Consequences should also allow for variations in the date and circumstances
surrounding an individual’s birth, upbringing, and death, including those as-
pects that also affect parents, partners and family members, especially “de-
mographic consequences” of the kind considered in Hammond (1998). Also
included should be any adverse consequences of living in an unequal society,
as well as any favourable consequences that are often modelled as altruism.
Other relevant dimensions can deal with society’s respect for individual and
group rights, as discussed in Hammond (1995), as well as “deontological”
or agent-relative consequences reflecting how well individuals respect their
social obligations.15
Of course, when considering intergenerational equity and discounting
the future, we also need to allow for intertemporal, even intergenerational
consequences. These imply that, in effect, one has overlapping generations.
Thus, with one exception, we assume that each consequence y ∈ Y has
attributes which include personal copies of any ethically relevant common
or impersonal circumstances that are shared with other persons.16
The one exception, which we use repeatedly from Section 5 on when
discussing extinction, is that we postulate one particular non-existence con-
sequence y0 ∈ Y . This is the unique personal consequence that comes about
if and only if the person concerned never exists. It corresponds to the con-
sequence denoted by d in Bommier and Zuber (2008). Note in particular
that our framework allows for a variable number of individuals, since those
who are excluded and so whose personal consequences are not deemed rel-
evant can be modelled as experiencing the non-existence consequence y0.
This device will be especially useful in Section 7 when we discuss variable
population numbers.
15This paragraph has been inspired in part by the issues that Patrick Suppes kindly
raised when discussing PH’s presentation of what became this paper to the May 1986
conference on “Distributive Justice and Inequality” at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.
At the time, the most meaningful part of PH’s inadequate response may have been the
remark that philosophers like Pat excel at drawing attention to the ethical relevance
of consequences that belong to domains much richer than those usually considered by
economists. In some ways, our oral discussion foreshadowed the kind of procedure that,
following Portmore (2007, 2009), Brown (2011), and Mukerji (2016), philosophers now
describe as “consequentialization”.
16We note that our approach is very different from that of Feng and Ke (2018), whose
individuals live for only one period, but care about the future because of altruism.
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3.2 Fundamental Cardinal Utility
A standard economist’s view is that ethical theory should prescribe norma-
tively appropriate decisions for society. Following Hammond (1996a, 1998)
in particular, we impose consequentialist rationality and continuity postu-
lates implying that there exists a unique cardinal equivalence class of von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions Y 3 y 7→ u(y) ∈ R with the prop-
erty that the consequences of prescribed behaviour in any finite decision tree
should be a consequence lottery λ ∈ ∆(Y ) that maximizes lifetime expected
utility
Eλu =
∑
y∈Y λ(y)u(y) (1)
over the finite set of lifetime consequence lotteries that are feasible in the
tree. Here we are using the familiar definition that any two utility functions
y 7→ u(y) and y 7→ u˜(y) are cardinally equivalent just in case there exist an
additive constant α ∈ R and a positive multiplicative constant ρ ∈ R such
that
u˜(y) = α+ ρ u(y) for all y ∈ Y (2)
Any function Y 3 y 7→ u(y) in this cardinal equivalence class can be
called a fundamental utility function. This is because the preferences it
represents are the same for all individuals, both potential and actual, and
so “fundamental” in the sense considered by Tinbergen (1957) and Kolm
(1972, 1994).
3.3 General Discrete Lotteries and Bounded Utility
Menger (1934) showed how to modify the well-known St. Petersburg para-
dox so that it applies to any unbounded utility function. This result led
Arrow (1951; 1965, pp. 28–44; 1971, ch. 2; 1972) to insist that utility should
be bounded. Indeed, suppose that expected utility is to be extended to a
continuous function defined not only over simple lotteries whose support is a
finite set of possible outcomes, but also over general discrete lotteries whose
support is a countably infinite set of possible outcomes, including extinction
dates. Then analysis such as that in Hammond (1998, Section 8), which
uses ideas from Blackwell and Girshick (1954), shows that any member of
the unique cardinal equivalence class of fundamental utility functions must
be bounded. Accordingly, from now on we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. There exist both a common lower bound u and a common
upper bound u¯ > u such that, for all possible consequences y ∈ Y that any
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potential individual may face, one has
u ≤ u(y) ≤ u¯ (3)
3.4 A Unique Normalized Fundamental Utility Function
The extensive literature on population ethics stemming from Sikora and
Barry (1978) and from Parfit (1984) commonly designates u(y0), the utility
of non-existence, as the neutral level of utility. Following Hammond (1988)
and many other works, we invoke what Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
(1995, 2005) refer to as the “zero-critical level” principle, which requires the
normalization
u(y0) = 0 (4)
Obviously, this first normalization is especially convenient when, as in Sec-
tion 7, we need to consider a possibly infinite set of potential persons, of
whom a variable finite number come into existence.
This reduces the class of cardinally equivalent utility functions satisfying
(4) to those related by the restricted class of transformations that satisfy
(2) for α = 0 — i.e, transformations of the form
u˜(y) = ρ u(y) for all y ∈ Y (5)
To single out a unique utility function from the equivalence class of fun-
damental utility functions related by (5), we impose a second normalization.
After ruling out the trivial case when u(y) ≡ 0 throughout y, the particular
normalization we adopt is
supy∈Y |u(y)| = 1 (6)
4 Utilitarianism for an Impartial Benefactor
4.1 Social Consequences as Personal Consequence Profiles
Initially, we consider a fixed finite set I of individuals, of size n = #I.
Later, starting in Section 5, we will extend our analysis to potentially infinite
populations. The latter is of course the case that was of most concern to
Arrow (1999a, b) when arguing that future utilities should be discounted.
For now, however, given the fixed set of individuals I of size n, we take
the social consequence domain to be the Cartesian product Y I of n copies
of the personal consequence domain Y . So each social consequence yI ∈ Y I
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is a mapping I 3 i 7→ yi ∈ Y that determines a personal consequence for
each of the n individuals in I. Equivalently, it is a list
yI = 〈yi〉i∈I ∈ Y I (7)
4.2 Biased and Extended Original Positions
Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977, 1978, 1979) indepen-
dently formulated the idea that ethical social decisions would be those that
were taken impartially in a version of what Rawls (1971) later described as
an “original position”, behind a “veil of ignorance” where the decision-maker
does not know which person she or he will become eventually. In contrast
to Rawls, what we will call the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position requires
the impartial benefactor to contemplate what to choose if faced with an
even chance lottery whose different outcomes are the personal consequences
of the various individuals in society — see also the discussion by Mongin
(2001) and others of Harsanyi’s “impartial observer”.
The theory presented here will also accommodate lotteries in the form
of biased original positions where, upon emerging from behind the prob-
abilistic version of the veil of ignorance, an arbitrary specified probability
distribution µ ∈ ∆(I) determines the probability µi of becoming each person
i ∈ I. Indeed, we consider extended original positions where these biased
probabilities of becoming different people can even be chosen.
4.3 Expected Utility from a Biased Original Position
Thus, we consider decision problems which reduce to choosing from con-
sequences that take the form of a lottery pair (λ, µ) ∈ ∆(Y I) × ∆(I)
over possible pairs (yI , i) ∈ Y I × I. So, for a suitable utility function
Y I × I 3 (yI , i) 7→ u∗(yI , i) ∈ R, expected utility is given by∑
yI∈Y I
∑
i∈I λ(y
I)µi u
∗(yI , i) (8)
The purpose of an original position, however, is to reduce each consequence
profile yI ∈ Y I to a single consequence yi ∈ I where i ∈ I is chosen at
random. This makes it natural to specify, for each i ∈ I, that u∗(yI , i) can
be reduced to u(yi).
Consider now, for each joint distribution λ ∈ ∆(Y I) and each i ∈ I, the
marginal consequence lottery margi λ ∈ ∆(Y ) over personal consequences
which, for each y ∈ Y , has probabilities given by
λi(y) := margi λ(y) := λ({yI ∈ Y I | yi = y}) (9)
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Then define the compound lottery µ ◦ λ ∈ ∆(Y × I) so that, for every (y, i)
in the domain Y × I, one has
(µ ◦ λ)(y, i) := µi ·margi λ(y) = µi · λi(y) (10)
Along with the assumption that u∗(yI , i) can be reduced to u(yi), definitions
(9) and (10) evidently imply that the expected value (8) can be written as
Eµ◦λ[u(y)] = Eµ [Eλi [u(yi)]] =
∑
i∈I µi
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) (11)
This is the expectation w.r.t. µ of different individuals’ expected utilities
arising from the relevant personal consequence lotteries λi.
4.4 An Original Position with Suppes Equity
No version of Adam Smith’s impartial spectator has the power to choose
what individual it should represent upon emerging from behind the veil of
ignorance. Thus, it must treat the biased original position µ ∈ ∆(I) as fixed.
Then it is reduced to choosing λ ∈ ∆(Y I) in order to maximize the function
(11) while treating µ ∈ ∆(I) as a fixed vector of probabilistic weights. So
the appropriate objective is the weighted utilitarian Bergson social welfare
function (or BSWF) defined by
∆(Y I) 3 λ 7→W (λ;µ) := Eµ◦λ[u(y)] =
∑
i∈I µi
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) (12)
We adapt definition 5 on p. 296 of Suppes (1966) to our context of
a weighted utilitarian Bergson social welfare function (12) — see also Sen
(1970, Chapter 9*). Specifically, we define a two-person decision situation as
a pair of lotteries ν, ρ ∈ ∆(Y I) for which there exist two individuals j, k ∈ I
such that for all other individuals i ∈ I \ {j, k}, the marginal distributions
νi, ρi ∈ ∆(Y ) satisfy νi = ρi. In this case equation (12) implies that the
welfare difference between ν and ρ is
W (ν;µ)−W (ρ;µ) = µj
∑
yj∈Y
[νj(yj)− ρj(yj)]u(yj)
+ µk
∑
yk∈Y
[νk(yk)− ρk(yk)]u(yk) (13)
Now, in this two-person situation, Suppes equity insists that interchanging
the pairs of marginal lotteries νj , νk and ρj , ρk of these two individuals should
have no effect on the social preference between ν and ρ in ∆(Y I). In other
words, we should consider the two new lotteries ν˜, ρ˜ ∈ ∆(Y I) whose marginal
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distributions ν˜i, ρ˜i ∈ ∆(Y ) satisfy ν˜i = ντ j,k(i) and ρ˜i = ρτ j,k(i) for all i ∈ I,
where I 3 i 7→ τ j,k(i) ∈ I is the transposition mapping that interchanges
individuals j and k while leaving all other individuals unaffected. Then
Suppes equity requires that
W (ν˜;µ) RW (ρ˜;µ) according as W (ν;µ) RW (ρ;µ) (14)
Evidently (13) is consistent with (14) for all pairs ν, ρ ∈ ∆(Y I) if and only
if µj = µk. Given that µ ∈ ∆(I) is a probability distribution and n = #I,
evidently Suppes equity holds for all pairs of individuals j, k ∈ I if and only
if the weights satisfy µi =
1
n for all i ∈ I. So instead of the weighted sum
(12), Suppes equity implies that we should have an unweighted utilitarian
BSWF of the form
∆(Y I) 3 λ 7→W (λ) := 1
n
∑
i∈I
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) (15)
This, of course, is precisely the form that Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi
(1953, 1955, 1977, 1978, 1979) advocated, taking the view that ethical de-
cisions are those that would be made by an impartial benefactor who, by
definition, acts as if facing an original position in which there is an equal
probability of becoming any of the n individuals i ∈ I.
5 Extinction Discounting of Future Generations
5.1 Generational Structures
Inspired by Arrow (1999a, b, 2007) as well as Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch.
9), our concern is whether one should discount the utilities of individuals who
belong to future generations. To discuss this formally, we need an extended
framework which recognizes that different individuals can belong to different
generations. So we label each individual i ∈ I by a pair (ti, ki) ∈ T × N.
Here T denotes the set of possible discrete times or dates, which is taken to
be a copy of N, the countably infinite set of natural numbers.
Corresponding to each time t ∈ T , generation t is defined as the enumer-
ated finite set Gt of all individuals born at date t. This set can be identified
with the Cartesian product set {t} × Nnt of individuals whose first label is
the date t, and whose second label is a number that ranges over the set Nnt
consisting of the first nt natural numbers. Evidently, nt = #Gt, and the set
of all individuals who are ever born is the countably infinite set
I = ∪t∈T ({t} × Nnt) = ∪t∈T ({t} ×Gt) ⊂ N× N (16)
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The fact that I is infinite creates the obvious difficulty that there is no way
for an ethical benefactor to be impartial by acting as if there were an equal
probability of becoming each individual i ∈ I.
5.2 A Hazard Process of Extinction and Survival
Following Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 9), our argument for extinction
discounting relies on treating extinction as a stochastic process. We do,
however, focus on unavoidable background extinction hazards, as opposed
to new hazards that might arise because of foolish policy. So, for each time
t ∈ T , let E>t and E≤t respectively denote the events that the background
process does not result in extinction until after time t, and the complemen-
tary event that extinction will occur at or before time t. Let σt ∈ [0, 1] denote
the survival probability of event E>t, and ηt := 1 − σt as the probability of
event E≤t.
The hazard rate associated with the extinction process determines the
conditional probability that extinction occurs at time t exactly given the
event E>t−1 that it had not already occurred by time t− 1. Thus, it is the
function given by
T 3 t 7→ ht := ηt − ηt−1
σt−1
=
σt−1 − σt
σt−1
= 1− σt
σt−1
∈ [0, 1] (17)
We assume that neither immediate extinction nor continued existence can
ever be predicted with probability 1, implying that 0 < ht < 1 for all
t ∈ T . Evidently (17) then implies that the functions t 7→ σt and t 7→ ηt are
respectively strictly decreasing and strictly increasing in t. We also assume
that, in the limit as t→∞, the extinction and survival probabilities satisfy
ηt → 1 and σt → 0 (18)
5.3 Extinction Adjusted Intergenerational Equity
In Section 4.2 we represented an original position by a probability distribu-
tion µ ∈ ∆(I), where I was finite. Now we consider the case introduced in
Section 5.1 when I is countably infinite. Instead of µ ∈ ∆(I), we require it
to belong to ∆∗(I), defined as the set of discrete distributions over I. That
is, the distribution µ takes the form of a mapping I 3 i 7→ µi ∈ [0, 1] for
which the countably infinite sum
∑
i∈I µi equals 1.
In this new setting, given any original position µ ∈ ∆∗(I), any date t ∈ T ,
and any individual i ∈ {t} × Gt, define the extinction adjusted probability
νi := µi/σt as the conditional probability of selecting i given the event E>t.
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Previously, when I was finite with n = #I, intergenerational equity required
that µi = µ¯ = 1/n for all i ∈ I. In this new setting when I is infinite but
there is a background extinction process, we say that the original position
µ ∈ ∆∗(I) satisfies extinction adjusted intergenerational equity just in case
the extinction adjusted probabilities satisfy νi = ν¯ for all i ∈ I, implying
that µi = ν¯ σt for all i ∈ {t} × Gt. For these to be probabilities in ∆∗(I),
evidently they must satisfy
1 =
∑
i∈I µi =
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈{t}×Gt
ν¯ σt = ν¯
∑
t∈T σt nt (19)
Given that, for each t ∈ T , the population of generation t is nt = #Gt, let
us now define the extinction discounted total population as the infinite sum
n(GT ) :=
∑
t∈T σt nt (20)
of non-negative terms, provided this sum converges to a finite number. But
(20) converges if and only if there exists ν¯ > 0 that solves equation (19). So
the following result follows immediately:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique original position µ ∈ ∆∗(I) satisfy-
ing extinction adjusted intergenerational equity if and only if the discounted
expected total population given by (20) is finite.
5.4 Utilitarianism with an Infinite Population
Consider any individual i who belongs to the generation Gt that comes into
existence starting at the specific date t ∈ T . In this new setting with a
background extinction process, we reinterpret the marginal personal conse-
quence lottery λi ∈ ∆(Y ) that faces any individual i ∈ I as the conditional
lottery that i would experience given the event E>t that extinction has not
occurred by date t.
With this interpretation, the weighted utilitarian BSWF can be defined
by (12) even in our setting with an infinite set I provided that one has a
well-defined infinite sum∑
i∈I µi
∑
yi∈Y
λi(yi)u(yi) =
∑
i∈I µi Eλiu (21)
By definition, any original position µ ∈ ∆∗(I) satisfies µi ≥ 0 for all I ∈ I
and
∑
i∈I µi = 1. This makes the following result entirely evident:
Proposition 2. Under the bounded utility assumption 1 in Section 3.3, the
utilitarian sum (21) converges absolutely for all original positions µ ∈ ∆∗(I)
and for all profiles 〈λi〉i∈I of personal consequence lotteries λi ∈ ∆(Y ).
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5.5 Extinction Discounted Utilitarianism
Say that the objective (21) is extinction discounted utilitarian just in case
the original position µ ∈ ∆∗(I) satisfies extinction adjusted intergenerational
equity. Putting Propositions 1 and 2 together leads to our main result:
Theorem 1. Given the fixed generation structure GT , under the normal-
ization imposed in Section 3.4, there is a uniquely specified extinction dis-
counted utilitarian welfare objective represented by the expected value of
Y I 3 yI 7→W (yI) = 1
n(GT )
∑
t∈T σt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi) (22)
if and only if n(GT ) defined by (20) is finite.
6 Sustainable Preferences
6.1 Sustainability
In Brundtland (1987), sustainable development was famously defined as:
. . . development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.
Decades before, Hicks (1946, p. 174) had a similar idea when he defined an
individual’s “income” as
. . . the maximum amount of money which the individual can
spend this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same
amount in real terms in each ensuing week.
In this spirit, and following Solow (1991, 2012), sustainability might be
defined as giving each generation access to an opportunity set that allows
it to be no worse off than it would have been with the opportunity set that
was available to any of its predecessors. This suggests trying to maximize
the initial generation’s welfare level subject to monotone sustainability —
i.e., requiring successive generations’ welfare levels to be non-decreasing over
time.17
17For a fuller discussion of sustainability in this sense, see inter alia Hammond (1993)
as well as Pezzey (1997, p. 451) and Asheim (2007). See also Llavador, Roemer, and
Silvestre (2015).
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In 1993 KA invited GC to present work related to the concept of sus-
tainable development to a Stanford workshop on “The Reconsideration of
Values”, in which PH also participated. This led to the articles Chichilnisky
(1996, 1997, 2009) which went beyond the extensively discussed criterion of
“sustainable development” and pioneered the new concept of “sustainable
preferences” or “sustainable welfare criterion”.
In the framework of generation structures set out in Section 5.1, it
is natural to consider sustainable preferences over lotteries with infinite-
dimensional personal consequence profiles yI ∈ Y I as outcomes. Moreover,
the relevant welfare criterion should be the expected value of some uniformly
bounded von Neumann–Morgenstern social utility function
Y I ⊇ D 3 yI 7→ V (yI) ∈ R (23)
defined on a possibly restricted domain D of personal consequence streams
yI that belong to the countably infinite Cartesian product set Y I . Moreover,
the function yI 7→ V (yI) should satisfy the Pareto criterion.
6.2 Dictatorship of the Present or the Future
Following Chichilnisky (1996, pp. 240–241), a “dictatorship of the present” is
a welfare criterion which, after some generation that depends on the choices
at hand, is insensitive to the welfare of all succeeding generations. In other
words, a dictatorship of the present occurs if a strict preference for one
personal consequence stream yI over an alternative stream y˜I can never be
overturned by any changes in these two streams that affect only sufficiently
distant generations.
By contrast, a “dictatorship of the future” is insensitive to the welfare
of the present, disregarding the welfare of all generations that precede some
generation. In other words, a dictatorship of the future occurs if a strict pref-
erence for one personal consequence stream yI over an alternative stream y˜I
can never be overturned by any changes in these two streams that affect
only generations sufficiently close to the present.
Using alternative terminology suggested by Heal (1998, p. 69), a cri-
terion displaying dictatorship of the present is insensitive to the long-run
future; whereas one displaying dictatorship of the future is insensitive to
the present. Sustainability allows neither form of temporal dictatorship.
Somewhat surprisingly, it is relatively easy to find welfare criteria that are
sustainable in this sense.
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6.3 Formal Definitions
The following formal definitions adapt those of Chichilnisky (1996) to the
current setting where: (i) there is a fixed generational structure GT , as
defined in Section 5.1; (ii) the social objective is the expected value of a von
Neumann–Morgenstern social utility function as in (23).
Definition 1. Given a generational structure GT , a welfare criterion V :
D → R on the domain D ⊆ Y I is a dictatorship of the present if for all
pairs yI , y˜I ∈ D with V (yI) > V (y˜I), there exists a date s = s(yI , y˜I) ∈ T
such that if any pair zI , z˜I ∈ Y I satisfies
i ∈ ∪st=1Gt =⇒ zi = yi and z˜i = y˜i (24)
then zI , z˜I ∈ D and V (zI) > V (z˜I).
Definition 2. Given a generational structure GT , a welfare criterion V :
D → R on the domain D ⊆ Y I is a dictatorship of the future if for all pairs
yI , y˜I ∈ D with V (yI) > V (y˜I), there exists a date s = s(yI , y˜I) ∈ N such
that if the pair zI , z˜I ∈ Y I satisfies
i ∈ ∪∞t=sGt =⇒ zi = yi and z˜i = y˜i (25)
then zI , z˜I ∈ D and V (zI) > V (z˜I).
Note that the only difference between these two definitions concerns the
conditions (24) and (25). These determine whether the strict preference
between two personal consequence streams remains unchanged after alter-
ations in the consequence streams only for all generations that originate:
either (i), in the case of Definition 1, after date s, so sufficiently far into the
future; or (ii), in the case of Definition 2, before date s, so sufficiently close
to the present;
The last definition of this Section also adapts that of Chichilnisky (1996)
to the current setting where, with fixed generation structure GT , the social
objective is the expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern social welfare
function defined on a restricted domain D ⊂ Y I .
Definition 3. Given a restricted domain D ⊂ Y I of admissible personal
consequence streams, a sustainable von Neumann–Morgenstern social utility
function is a mapping D 3 yI 7→ V (yI) ∈ R which satisfies the Pareto
criterion, and is neither a dictatorship of the present, nor a dictatorship of
the future.
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6.4 Example of Sustainable Preferences
The following example offers a two-dimensional parametric class of sustain-
able preferences.
Example 1. Given the fixed generation structure GT , consider any fixed
stream of discount factors βT ∈ RT++ for which total discounted population∑
t∈T βt #Gt is finite. Suppose the boundedness assumption 1 of Section
3.3 is satisfied. Then, for any pair of parameters α ∈ [0, 1] and ω ∈ (0, 1),
consider the von Neumann–Morgenstern welfare function
Y I 3 yI 7→ Ψ(yI ;βT , α, ω) := (1− ω)
∑
t∈T βt
∑
i∈Gt(yI)
u(yi)
+ ω
[
α lim inf
i→∞
u(yi) + (1− α) lim sup
i→∞
u(yi)
]
(26)
This puts positive weight 1− ω on the first term, which is a dictatorship of
the present, and positive weight ω on the second term, which is a dictatorship
of the future. The strict convex combination of these two defines sustainable
preferences.
For a possible interpretation of (26), suppose we relax condition (18) so
that, for some ω ∈ (0, 1), it becomes ηt → 1 − ω and σt → ω. Suppose
too that for each t ∈ T we interpret βt as the conditional probability of
generation Gt coming into existence given that extinction does occur at
some finite time. Then (26) becomes expected utility when:
1. with probability 1− ω, extinction does occur in finite time, with sur-
vival probabilities specified by βt;
2. with probability ω, extinction never occurs, and the utility of the re-
sulting infinite consequence stream is given by the second term of (26).
Note too that the second term of (26) is an asymptotic form of the
“Hurwicz criterion” for decisions under uncertainty that was discussed, inter
alia, in Arrow and Hurwicz (1972). Here the parameter α can be regarded
as a “coefficient of pessimism”.
6.5 Other Sustainable Preferences
Going beyond the class of preferences set out in Example 1, Chichilnisky
(1996) characterizes sustainable preferences for the important special case
when the preference ordering over sure consequence streams is represented
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by a utilitarian social welfare function defined on the Banach space `∞ of
all bounded utility streams in R∞ that is not only strictly increasing and
continuous, but is also linear. For this important special case, Theorem 2
of Chichilnisky (1996) offers a complete characterization of all sustainable
welfare criteria using finitely additive measures that represent linear func-
tionals in the dual of `∞. See Chichilnisky (1996, 1997, 2009), Heal (2000),
and Lauwers (2017) for further discussion.
Among other work that discusses sustainable preferences, especially in
the context of renewable and exhaustible resources, we mention Figuie`res
and Tidball (2012). This builds on work by Chichilnisky, Heal and Beltratti
(1995) that considers “the green golden rule”.
7 Endogenous Population
7.1 A Domain with Endogenous Generation Structures
The framework of our earlier working paper Chichilnisky et al. (2018) al-
lowed the generation structure GT to be chosen. In this extended framework,
since the set of individuals I is variable, the concept of an original position
µ ∈ ∆∗(I) needs to be changed.
First, we replace the fixed generation structure GT = 〈Gt〉t∈T of Section
5.1, with Gt = Nnt for each t ∈ T and I = ∪t∈T ({t} ×Gt), by:
1. an extended generation structure MT = 〈Mt〉t∈T of finite maximal
population sets for each generation, with Mt = Nmt for each t ∈ T ;
2. an overall maximal set M := ∪t∈T ({t} ×Mt).
Given the structure MT , we limit attention to a restricted domain D(MT )
of sequences (GT , yI) that satisfy:
1. Gt ⊆Mt for all t ∈ T ;
2. yi ∈ Y \ {y0} for all i ∈ I = ∪t∈TGt.
Thus, the personal consequence of each i ∈ Gt excludes non-existence.
7.2 An Extended Original Position
We can now extend this domain D(MT ) to a new domain Dˆ(MT ) that
includes any personal consequence profile yM ∈ YM for the fixed maximal
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set of potential persons. To do this, simply recognize that all individuals
i ∈ ∪t∈T (Mt \Gt) do not exist by defining
yi = y0 for all i ∈ ∪t∈T (Mt \Gt) (27)
This brings us back to our previous framework with the fixed generation
structure MT replacing GT .
If an original position ν ∈ ∆∗(M) exists that satisfies the appropriate
intergenerational equity condition given extinction, there must exist a con-
stant κ > 0 such that νi = κσt for all t ∈ T and i ∈Mt. As in the derivation
of (19) in Section 5.3, a necessary and sufficient condition for such an origi-
nal position to exist is that the extinction discounted sum of the maximum
population number in each generation given by
m(MT ) :=
∑
t∈T σt #Mt =
∑
t∈T σtmt (28)
is finite. When it is finite, the obvious counterpart of (22) is the NM welfare
function
YM 3 yM 7→WM (MT , yM ) := 1
m(MT )
∑
t∈T σt
∑
i∈Mt
u(yi) (29)
Because (27) implies that u(yi) = 0 for all i ∈ ∪t∈T [{t}×(Mt \Gt)], then
provided that m(MT ) defined by (28) is finite, the extinction discounted
welfare sum (29) can obviously be reduced to
W (GT , yI) :=
1
m(MT )
∑
t∈T σt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi) (30)
That is, we exclude the zero utilities of all the individuals whose existence is
precluded by (27). The result is a welfare function defined on the restricted
domain D(MT ) of pairs (GT , yI) satisfying restrictions 1 and 2 above.
7.3 Total Expected Utility
The only role that the extended generation structure MT and, when it
is well-defined, the associated constant m(MT ) play in (30) is in allowing
W (GT , yI) to be interpreted as expected welfare for an impartial benefactor
facing an original position with extinction discounted intergenerational eq-
uity. This interpretation relies only on the maximal generational structure
MT and implied extinction discounted total population m(MT ) being large
enough to include all relevant generational structures GT that could result
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from policy choices. This allows us to treat MT and m(MT ) as exogenous
provided we restrict attention to the domain Dˆ(MT ) — or equivalently, after
removing non-existent individuals, to the domain D(MT ).
Once we do treat MT and m(MT ) as exogenous, and so fixed constants,
maximizing the expectation of (30) is obviously equivalent to maximizing
extinction discounting total utility, defined by
W total(GT , yI) :=
∑
t∈T σt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi) (31)
This definition makes the extended generation structure MT and, when it is
well-defined, the associated constant m(MT ) entirely irrelevant, except in-
sofar as one is able to construct them throughout the domain of the function
D 3 (GT , yI) 7→W total(GT , yI).
7.4 The Domain for Total Expected Utility
We now construct the domain D over which, for some large enough set of
potential individuals, the total utilitarian objective (31) can be interpreted
as rescaled expected utility of an impartial benefactor in a suitable original
position with intergenerational equity and extinction discounting. To do so,
first define for each non-negative real r ∈ R+:
1. the set
Gr := {GT |
∑
t∈T σt #Gt ≤ r}
of generation structures for which the extinction discounted total pop-
ulation does not exceed r;
2. the associated domain
Dr := {(GT , yI) ∈ Gr × yI | ∀i ∈ ∪t∈TGt : yi 6= y0}
Then the domain D we are seeking is evidently the infinite union D :=
∪r∈R+Dr. This, of course, is the domain of associated pairs (GT , yI) over
which the extinction discounted total population
∑
t∈T σt #Gt is not only
finite, but uniformly bounded. Indeed, because W total(GT , yI) is uniformly
bounded over this domain D, its expected value represents the appropri-
ate preference ordering over the space ∆∗(D) of discrete lotteries over this
domain.
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Let G denote the domain of all generation structures GT for which∑
t∈T σt #Gt is finite. We remark that then (31) remains valid as a def-
inition of a BSWF even over the extended domain
Dˆ := (GT , yI) ∈ G × yI | ∀i ∈ ∪t∈TGt : yi 6= y0}
Thus, the extinction discounted total population
∑
t∈T σt #Gt need not
be uniformly bounded if one does not require there to be one extinction
discounted original position that works throughout the domain Dˆ of pairs
(GT , yI).
8 Concluding Discussion
8.1 Revisiting Intergenerational Equity
In Sections 3 and 4 we reviewed the ethical arguments we favour for choos-
ing policies whose consequences maximize the expected utility of an impar-
tial benefactor. In particular, this benefactor should act as if placed in a
Vickrey–Harsanyi original position with an equal probability of becoming
any individual, as the Suppes equity criterion requires. When confronted,
however, with long-term consequences such as those connected to climate
change, then as argued in Hammond (1973), since any finite horizon will
eventually be reached, consistent planning requires us to allow an indefinite
future. With a potential infinite set of individuals as well as infinite time,
we are confronted with what Arrow (1999a, b) called the “strong argument”
for discounting the welfare of future generations. This is that, given other
standard assumptions, avoiding discounting would produce some form of
logical contradiction.
To circumvent this argument, we first dispose of a third source of possible
divergence in expected utility sums — unbounded utility. Specifically, we
follow Arrow (1951, 1965, 1971, 1972) himself and assume that the common
fundamental utility function of each potential individual is bounded both
above and below. Then we circumvent the problem of infinitely many time
periods by first recognizing an exogenous background extinction process
ensuring that with probability 1 all life will cease in finite time. Then
we modify intergenerational equity by considering an extinction adjusted
original position in which individuals in different generations get chosen
with equal conditional probabilities given that their generation survives the
extinction process. We show that this adjusted original position exists if
and only if, given the fixed background extinction process, the expected
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discounted population is uniformly bounded by some finite number. When
this condition is satisfied, the assumption of bounded utility ensures that
the impartial benefactor’s expected utility sum converges absolutely.
Our great friend KA had espoused both strong and weak arguments in
favour of discounting the welfare of future generations not only in writings
such as Arrow (1999a, b, 2007), but also in later oral discussions with PH
and others. Yet his willingness to engage in these discussions suggests that,
in the end, he may have been starting to experience some doubt about
whether these two arguments, which he attributed to Koopmans, really had
settled the discounting issue. Perhaps he was moving rapidly toward our
own current view that the purely technical difficulties captured by the strong
argument should not be allowed to overwhelm pragmatic ethical arguments
which recognize the existence of a background extinction process, and allow
extinction discounting.
8.2 Beyond Welfarism
As in most of public economics, including work by KA himself, the ap-
proach set out in this paper is utilitarian. It is a fortiori welfarist as well as
consequentialist, though with an all-encompassing domain of personal con-
sequences, as explained in Section 3.1. Nevertheless, it is just one way of
looking at the ethics of public and private decision-making. Indeed, several
other approaches have commanded the attention of philosophers when they
undertake ethical arguments. Among these others are: (i) contractarianism;
(ii) Kantian ethics; (iii) Aristotelian ethics; (iv) arguments based on rights
or liberty. This is not the place for a detailed discussion, some elements of
which are provided in Stern (2014a; 2015, Chapter 6), along with references
to further discussion of these different ethical perspectives.
Here we simply note that these four perspectives that go beyond wel-
farism would all seem to exclude discounting the welfare of individuals who
belong to future generations. It follows that all urge strong action on cli-
mate change. Specifically, a contractarian would likely regard a reasonable
or acceptable social contract as excluding decisions such as those result-
ing from an unacceptable dictatorship of the present which rides roughshod
over future lives by refusing to manage climate change. A Kantian categor-
ical imperative is to behave as you would have others behave; that would
likely involve respecting others’ livelihoods, even if they live decades later.
Similarly, an Aristotelian notion of virtue would likely prohibit seriously
damaging others’ lives in pursuit of narrow self-interest. Finally, any ap-
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proach based on rights would surely include respecting the rights of future
generations.
We conclude that ethical arguments against discrimination by date of
birth also apply in ethical frameworks that transcend utilitarian consequen-
tialism. “Pure-time discounting” is not merely a narrow technical concern
for nerdy economists. Avoiding this kind of discrimination is fundamental
to most ethical doctrines.
8.3 The “Weak Argument”: A More Optimistic Scenario?
Much remains to be done in reforming the world’s economic system in order
to avoid the serious risk of catastrophic climate change due to excessive
greenhouse gas emissions. Other serious risks include excessive acidification
by dissolved CO2, not only of oceans, but also of reserves of fresh water.
Another important concern is the loss of biodiversity.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the sacrifices required of either
the current or future generations may turn out ultimately to be considerably
less than had been feared back in the late 1990s. This was the period when
negotiations were conducted which led to the Kyoto Protocol being approved
by 160 nations in 1997, and becoming part of international law in 2005 after
enough nations had ratified it.18
First, as is becoming widely recognized, the last ten or fifteen years have
seen quite extraordinary technical progress, especially in using wind and
solar power instead of steam to generate electricity. Along with technologies
such as those that allow vehicles to use electric power to varying degrees,
this is part of a general process whereby clean or zero-carbon technologies
have become cheaper than high-carbon technologies in many sectors and
geographical areas. In large measure this transformation has come about
as a result of combining changes in social priorities with a process that
KA did so much to illuminate in Arrow (1962) — namely the dynamics
of learning by doing. Indeed, we may have within reach a new model of
sustainable growth which is much more attractive and more inclusive than
those experienced hitherto. It could include, for example, cities where the
inhabitants and commuting workers can move and breathe, There can also
be far higher resource productivity, as well as ecosystems which are robust
and fruitful. Achieving such goals will require radical change that relies on
major innovation and large investments. Those investments, however, would
likely yield very high social returns.
18Chichilnisky and Sheeran (2009) offer one account of these negotiations, particularly
the final stages that took place in Kyoto.
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Second, it may be appropriate to draw attention to the much less well
known yet highly promising technologies for CO2 removal by direct air cap-
ture that one of us (GC) has been helping to pioneer.19 Moreover, there
is some prospect in the next few years of complementary technical changes
enhancing the use of CO2 as a valuable industrial input. Indeed, a carbon
X-prize was recently announced, intended to “challenge the world to reimag-
ine what we can do with CO2 emissions by incentivizing and accelerating the
development of technologies that convert CO2 into valuable products.”20
Until relatively recently, it had seemed that the world would find it dif-
ficult to reduce the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases to safer
levels without significant sacrifices of economic progress. The prospect of
such sacrifices had become of great concern to KA who, during the last two
decades of his life, addressed this kind of issue in several co-authored pub-
lications such as Arrow et al. (2003, 2004, 2012, 2013, 2014). Yet thanks
in large part to recent technological developments, the world, including we
think KA himself during his last years, has been thinking more and more
about policies that can manage change rather than discussing what “sacri-
fices” might be worthwhile. Indeed, there is the real prospect that directly
capturing CO2 from the air could soon replace existing sources of this widely
used industrial gas and earn sufficient profit to make the sacrifice disappear
entirely. In any case, this emphasis on how to manage change becomes even
more urgent once we begin to consider other issues, such as those concerning
human health and the robustness of ecosystems; here too KA has had so
much to say. His legacy is truly extraordinary.
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